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UNITED STATES

v.
"-l MARJRIE

Cert. to CA 10
(Lewis, Seth, Holloway)
Also motion to file out-oftime petition
Federal-criminal

Untimely (non-

jurisdictional)~;

~The CA 10 opinion was rendered on November 8, 1973, and the petjtion
was filed on December 28, 1973.
jurisdictionally out-of-time.

Thus the petition is 20 days nonThe motion to file a late brjef says

that the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Department of
Justice, "which normally handles civil cases," did not call the case
to the· attention of the SG' s office until December 12, 1973, when the
0:
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case was already untimely.

The motion stresses the importance of

the case to the Indians and says that they should not be made to
pay for a Government blunder.
1.

After a nonjury trial in USDC (D. Wyo, J. Kerr) resps were

convicted of violating 18

u.s.c.

1154 (see appendix to this memo).

The conviction was reversed by the CA 10, however, principally on
vagueness grounds but with an additional suggestion that the Government and the Indians lacked the power to make resps' conduct a crjme.
The U.S. attacks this decision across the board.
2.

FACTS:

There is little debate about the facts.

resps operate the Blue Bull Bar on .land patented in fee to

In brief,
t~eir

predecessor by the United States but located within the boundarjes
of the Wind River Indian Reservation.

They hold a liquor license

from the State of Wyoming but none from the two occupying Indian
tribes, the Arapahoe and Shoshone.

Until 1971 no such license was

required and the grant of the state license sufficed to allow resps
to sell liquor on their land.

At that time the Tribes passed an

ordinance, duly published in the Federal Register, which made such
a license mandatory for sales within the reservation.
Resps then sought a license but were turned down.

According

to the petition the bar remained closed for a short period after the
denial, but resps subsequently resumed ·business without the tribal
license.

This prosecution resulted.

-33.

OPINIONS BELOW:

The USDC concluded that resps'

land was

within Indian Country, as defined by 18

u.s.c.

were therefore subject to federal law.

The court further found that

1154, and that resps

,,

I

the Wind River Tribes had passed an ordinance requiring a license in
conformity with 18

u.s.c.

'

1161, and that resps had nevertheless so+d

liquor on the reservation without a license from the tribes.

This

was enough for conviction.
The CA 10 in a somewhat muddled effort reversed.

According

to the Court of Appeals the important question was whether resps'
land fell within the definition of "fee-patented lands in non-Indian
communi ties."

If not1 the Government had failed to prove an essential

element of the crime.

The court then stated (italics theirs): "The

./

proof in the record herein of this element of the crime is inconclusive
and indefinite."

The problem, according to the court, was that there

were no standards for determining what a "community" was, no standards
for determining what a "non-Indian" community was (i.e. what percentage

t

of Indians), and no standards for determining what an "Indian" was
(i.e. what percentage of Indian blood).

The court concluded:

"We must hold that the terminology of 'non-Indian community'
is not capable of sufficiently precise definition to serve as an
element of the crime herein considered, aside from other factors
or elements with similar infirmities. The statute is thus
fatally defective by reason of this indefinite and vague terminology."
The CA supported this result by referring to United States v.
National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29, and Connally v. General
Construction Co.,

269 U.S. 385.

According to the court, a person

r
I

II
J
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,

cannot be required to guess at the statutes meaning nor should reasonable
men differ as to its application.

Furthermore, the court seemed to say,

the USDC erred by requiring resps to show that they were within the
exception to the definition instead of requiring the prosecution to
show that the definition fit them.
353

u.s.

See Gruenwald v. United States,

391.

The court also questioned the "authority of the Government or
of the Tribes to regulate the defendants' business in a way that a
failure to conform constitutes a crime."

(emphasis theirs).

The court

expressed doubt about whether the Government could regulate a business
,-

on .land it granted in fee and stated positively that any such power,
should it exist, could not be delegated to the Indians.

The Jndians

were merely a voluntary association of citizens with no authority
over persons(ineligible for membership)on their own lands.

Cases

~

discussing the sovereignty of Indian tribes were distinguished as
being in the "context of relationships between a Tribe and the federal
or state government."

As the court stated:

"Congress cannot delegate

its authority to a private,. voluntary organization, which is obviously
not a governmental agency, to regulate a business on privately-owned
lands, no matter where located."
4.

CONTENTIONS:
(1) Petr urges that the CA 10 opinion, far from following

National Dairy Corp., supra, is inconsistent with it.

Here the

resps had ample warning that their conduct would violate the law

'

I

-5-

because federal officials had told them to secure a license or face
prosecution.

Re s p tried and failed to comply.

In a case not inv olv-

ing First Amendme nt rights the notice in the actual case before t h e
court is the relevant factor.

These defendants knew they were

violating the law.
Furthermore there was no basis for thinking that the Blue
Bull Bar could come within the exception, almost no matter what
definition was adopted.

The bar was about three-quarters of a mile

from Fort Washakie which apparently is the leading Indian community
in the area.

Resps mightbe able to argue that they were not part of

this community, but they could not establish any other community to
be part of.

According to the Government the nearest non-Indian com-

munity (by some unexplained definition) was 15 miles away.
(2) The Government also claims a conflict with Buster v.
Wright, 135 F.

947

(CA 8), where theCA 8 held that Indian tribes

had inherent authority "to license and tax non-Indians conducting
business on fee patented land within the exterior boundaries of
their reservations.''

(petn., p. 15).

TheCA lO's holding to the

contrary ignores a line of cases holding that Indian tribes are
governmental units with various sovereign powers.
(3) Finally

petr urges that the suggestion that Congress

could not regulate liquor sales on private lands within an Indian
reservation is contrary to Perrin v. United States, 232
The Constitution, art I, sec. 8,

u.s.

478.

(authorizing Congress to regulate

-6-

"

commerce "with the Indian Tribes") is a sufficient grant of power.
Respondents' contentions:

Resps merely say that the liquor business
I

on Indian lands will not go unregulated because of this decision since
state control will continue.
substantive arguments at all.

Resps do not respond to the Governments
They do suggest that the petition's

lack of timeliness should weigh heavily if not totally against it.
There are three amicus briefs.

T'.VO supporting the Govern-

ment emphasize the importance of Indians being able to regulate the
liquor trade within their reservations.

The third brief filed by

the State of Wyoming on behalf of resps says that state licenses
should not be rendered a nullity by Tribal action.
5.

DISCUSSION:
(1) There is no question that resps knew their selling of

liquor without a tribal license was considered by the federal govern-

- ----------

ment and the Indians to violate 18

u.s.c.

1154.

An unreasonable

interpretation by the authorities would not necessarily save an unfathomable statute, but the application of the statute to resps
hardly seems arbitrary.

---------------

The CA 10 mixed its vagueness discussion

with observations which seemed to make the question more one of
burden of proof.

The court apparently felt the evidence did not

show that resps were without the language of the exception.

Accord-

ing to the government, resps failed to show any reason to believe
·~

the exception applied.

(One resp in fact testified: "We are kind

of out there by ourselves, you know.")

Viewing the facts as stated

..
-7in the two lower court opini.o ns it is quite difficult to see how
the phrase "non-Indian community" could apply here.
(2) Buster v. Wright, supra, did hold that the Creek Indian
Nation had authority to tax non-citizens of the Tribe for the privilege of transacting business within its borders, despite the fact
that the business was conducted on fee patented lands.

The authority

was said to be "one of the inherent and essential attributes of its
original sovereignty."

The CA 8 did note, however, that the power of

the U.S. Government to permit others to trade on the lands without an
Indian license was not at issue.

One might argue that Buster does

not control a case in which a state has applied its laws to land
placed under state jurisdiction by the federal government and .the
Indians have rendered the state law a nullity.
{3} In Perrin v. United States, supra, the Court stated:
"The power of Congress to prohibit the introduction of
intoxicating liquors into an Indian reservation, wheresoever
situate, and to prohibit traffic in such liquors with tribal
Indians, whether upon or off a reservation and whether within
or without the limits of a State, does not admit of any doubt."
In that case Congress had imposed a restriction on ceded lands within
the vicinity of lands retained by the Indians which prohibited sale
of intoxicating liquors.

The Court noted that Congress had broad

discretion to control the sale of liquor even on lands merely proximate to Indian lands as part of its ,protective concern for the Indians.
That decision seems broad enough to sustain the constitutionality of
18

u.s.c.

1154.

-.

-8-

I

In general, I think the decision of the CA 10 seems wrong.
The suggestion that the federal government and the Indians could not
I

\

regulate the sale of liquor near to Indian lands seems contrary to

-

the tenor if not the actual holdings of earlier cases, and is not
convincing.

The vagueness argument also seems weak.

Resps had notice

that their conduct would be considered a crime and merely guessed
wrong about the merits of their case.
a vagueness problem.

That does not seem to me to be

I do not think it was improper to require the

defendants to introduce persuasive evidence to bring themselves within
the exception to the statutory definition once the sale within Indian
boundaries was shown.
There is a response.
2/12/74

Farr

USDC and CA ops in petn.

..

.
18 U .R.C. 1151 Jll'oddC"s in p r rtill('Jlt l>~u:t :
Exc·c·pt ns otlwnYi se prcn·i(h· cl in ~rr·ti'•~l:-: Jl!i-1
and llGG of thi s title, tllr t r nn "Inrli< n c· ountry", as n secl in thi s chaptrr, m ean=- ( a) all
]and within tlw li111its of any Indi an r<·~c·rvn
tion llllClcr tlJC jurisdic-ti on of th e "'Cnitc·J f:.itnt(' s
GoY<' rnment, JJOtwith :-.;t:m dill ~ the i:--:-1 ~~11c: c of
any ]'latent, and, inC'lnclin ~ ri ght ~- of-v.-n :· nm. thrmwh the 1·rscrYatwn
.
*· * *
nino·
b
b

18 U.S.C. 11:5:1: pl'OYid es in p ertin ent part:
(a) ·>r * ·>r whoever introclnccs or attc>m pt .~ -to
introduc-e any malt, spirHn o u ~ , or Yinons 1icpwr,
including beer, ale, and ''inc, or any ardent or
into:x ic-a ting licpJ or of any kj ncl ''"ha t:::oe,-eT into
the Indian countr.r, Rhall, for the fir:-:; t o ffc-n~c ,
he fined not .more than $GOO or impri sonc>cl n ot
more than one year, or both; and, f or each
snbseqnc-nt of-fen se>, he fined not more than
$2,000 or impriSOJ)ecl not more than fin' y ea1·s,
or both.

*

.*

*

(c) The term "Indian country" as u secl in
this scctjon docs not inrlndc fre -patrntecl buds
in non-Indian comnmniti es or rights-of- way
through Indian rcserYation ~ , and thi:-) settion
does not apply to such Junds or right s-of-,yay
in the nh:)enc·e of a treaty or statute extend ing
the Indian liquor laws thereto.
18 U.S.C. 11G1 provides :
rrhe proYi sions of sections 115:1:, 115G, 3113,
3488, and 3G18, of thit) title, shall n ot appl.v
wi01in ~my arra .that is not Indian country, nor
to nny act or hnn sac-tion within any nrra of
lnclian c·otult ry JWoYidrd sndt ad or trnn ~a<.- ~ ion
is in eonfol'miiy both "·ith the ]a"·s of th e ~t~1t e
in whic·h sll(·h :wt or tran sac-t ic)}} oc·rm·s ~m d
wiih :m on1inantc dnl)' ad op1t'd h~· th r t .-ihc
Jw.Yi11g j nri sc1 ittion on·r snth a l'ra of I1 ~..ia n
c·.mmh.r, tcrtifird hy the· S<.' c·rrtnry of th e Iqter~or and published in the Federal Re-

gister.
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BOBTAIL MEMO
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Joel Klein

DATE:

November 7, 1974

No. 73-1018, U.S. v. Mazurie
This is a relatively trivial case involving the question
of whether Congress can authorize the Indian tribes to license
the sale of liquor in taverns that are located on small,
'--

privately-owned, enclaves on the Indian reservation.
in effect, said no.

My

CAlO,

own thinking is that CAlO ought to be

reversed.
can
I/see no constitutional objection to a statute allowing
the Indians to decide who will sell liquor on or near an
Indian community.

Congress traditionally has been allowed

great latitude under its constitutional authority to regulate
commerce with the Indians.

CAlO's first claim- that the

definition of "non-Indian community" is vague - is silly,
particularly in this case where the defendant was well-apprised
that he was violating the law and where no First Amendment
rights are at stake.

CAlO, in free-floating fashion, also

suggested that perhaps Congress was without authority to
~Co~

regulate in this area and, in any event,( could not delegate
that authority to the Indians.

But this Court has repeatedly

held that Congress may regulate the sale of liquor to Indians,
even on non-Indian land.

E.g., Perrin v. U.S., 232 U.S. 478.

2.
Nor is there anything to the delegation point.

There is little

left to the doctrine of "unconstitutional delegation," and, in
general, Congress permissibly delegates much authority to the
Indians.

Thus, there are no serious constitutional questions

here.
There is, however, a non-constitutional ground on which

to ~

CAlO's decision.

The CA, reversing a finding of

USDC without acknowledging the reversal, held that the government had failed to prove that respondent was not located in
a "non-Indian" community.

Thus the government did not establish

a jurisdictional element of the crime.

It seems to me, however,

that USDC, not CAlO, is correct on this factual issue.

There

can be no serious contention that respondent's tavern was in
a non-Indian community since approximatel1 80% of the 200

-

families living within 20 square miles of the tavern are
Indians.

I would, therefore, reverse CAlO's reversal of

(

USDC on the ground that USDC's finding of fact was not clearly
erroneous.
Although I recommend reversal, I can understand why CAlO
was troubled.

Respondent is licensed by the state and

operating on his own land.

It seems a bit unfair to require

him to get a license from the Indians as well.

Perhaps what

is most offensive ab ovt: the scheme is that the Indians
can, without any review, discriminate against non-Indians,
such as respondent, in the granting of licenses.

Nevertheless,

3.

Congress' power in this area has been exceptionally broad,
and to affirm CAlO would require swimming upstream for far
more time than I think the effort would be worth.

J.K.
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CHAMBERS O F

.JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

December 20, 1974

73-1018- U. S. v. Mazurie
Dear Bill,
I agree with your opinion for the
Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,
()
I'

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

Copies to the Conference

('

>'
'

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

December 21, 1974

Dear Bill:
In . 73-1018, U.S. v. MAZURIE I
· .. •
'1

voted the other way though at the time
the case seemed marginal.

I will however

acquiese in your opinion.

If there is

a dissent, I will of course take another
look.

(. ,,I L·. ~~-------------William
.,.~

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
cc:

-

The Conference

.}
1.'

.·; ~

'

~Douglas

'l'o

3rd DRAFT

'fhe Chief Justice
ltr . Justice Douglas
Mr . Justice Brennan
Mr. Justice Stewart
Mr. Justice White
M:r . Justice Marshall
Mr. Justice Blackmun
"1r . Justice Powell

From: Rehnquist, J.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STl\f~ated: _ _ __
Recirculated: /.t-z 9;;./
No. 73-1018
) On Writ of Certiorari to
the United States Court
. D
It M
. t
of Appeals for the Tenth
M ar t m ewa
azune e a1.
c·lrCUl't•
United States Petitioner

v.'

'

[December -, 1974]

MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The respondents were convicted of introducing spirituous beverages into Indian country, in violation of 18
U. S. C. § 1154. 1 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed. United States v. Mazurie, 487 F. 2d 14
(1973). We granted certiorari, 415 U.S. 947 (1974), in
order to consider the Solicitor General's contentions that
18 U. S. C. § 1154 is not unconstitutionally vague, that
Congress has the constitutional authority to control the
sale of alcoholic beverages by non-Indians on fee-patented
1 "18 U. S. C. § 1154 provides in pt>rtinent part:
"(a) ... whoever introduces or attempts to introduce nny malt,
spirituous, or vinous liquor, meluding beer, ale, und wint>, or any
:.mlent or intoxicating liquor of any kind whatsoever into the Indmn
country, shall, for the first ofi'Pnse, be fined not more than $500 or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and, for each subseqnPnt offPnsc, be fined not more than $2,000 or Imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.

" (c) The term "Indi:m countr.:" R'l used in this section doeH not
include fee-patented land::; in non ·Indian communities or rights-ofway through Indian re~ervatiom;, and this section does not apply to
such land:; or rights-of-way in th<' ·~b~l'nce of a treaty or statute
extending the Indian liquor laws thrrcto."

T

T
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UNITED STATES v. MAZURIE

land within the boundaries of an Indian reservation, and
that Congress could validly make a delegation of this
authority to a reservation's tribal council. We reverse
the Court of Appeals.
I
The Wind River Reservation was established by treaty
in 1868. Located in a rather arid portion of central
Wyoming, at least some of its 2,300,000 acres have been
described by Justice Cardozo as "fair and fertile," Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U. S. 476, 486 (1937).
It straddles the Wind River, with its remarkable canyon,
and lies in a mile-high basin at the foot of the Wind River
Mounta~ns, whose rugged, glaciated peaks and ridges form
a portion of the Continental Divide. 2 The reservation is
occupied by the Shoshone and Arapahoe Tribes. Although these tribes were once "ancestral foes," Shoshone
Tribe v. United States, supra, at 486, they are today
jointly known as the Wind River Tribes. As a result of
various patents, substantial tracts of non-Indian held land
are scattered within the reservation's boundaries. It was
on such non-Indian land that respondents Martin and
Margaret Mazurie operated their bar, which did business
under the corporate name of The Blue Bull, Inc.
Before 1953 federal law generally prohibited the introduction of alcoholic beverages into "Indian country."
18 U.S. C.§ 1154 (a). "Indian country" was defined by
18 U. S. C. § 1151 to include non-Indian held lands
"within the limits of any Indian reservation." 3 In 1949,
2 F. Harmston, Wind River Basin 2 (1953); H. Granger, et al.,
Mineral Resources of the Glacier Primitive Area, Wyoming, Geological Survey Bull. No. 1319-F, F2-95 (1971).
8 "18 U. S. C. § 1151 provides in pertinent part:
"Except as otherwise provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this
title, the term "Indian country," as used in this chapter, means
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under tl1er

II

~··
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the term was given a narrower meaning, insofar as rele..
vent to the liquor prohibition, so as to exclude both
fee-patented lands within ~<non-Indian comrnunitie~and
rights-of-way through reservations.• Act of May 24,
1949, 63 Stat. 89, 94, 18 U. S. C. § 1154 (c), supra, n. 1.
The quoted term is not defined, a fact which creates problems with which we shall shortly deal. In 1953 Congress
passed local option legislation allowing Indian tribes, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, to regulate
the introduction of liquor into Indian country, so long as
state law was not violated. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat.
586, 18 U. S.C. § 1161:' The Wind River Tribes responded
to this option by adopting an ordinance which permitted
liquor sales on the reservation if made in accordance with
Wyoming law. When The Blue Bull originally opened,
a liquor license had been issued to it by Fremont County,
Wyoming, and its operation was therefore consistent with
that tribal ordinance. But in 1971 the Wind River Tribes
adopted a new liquor ordinance, Ordinance No. 26. 5
That ordinance required that retail liquor outlets within
Indian country obtain both tribal and state licenses.
In 1972, the Mazuries applied for a tribal license, after

..,

juriEdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the
issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through
the reservation . . . ."
4 "18 U. S. C. § 1161 provides:
"The proviswns of sections 1154, 1156, 3113, 3488, and 3618, of
thi~ title, shall not apply w1t bin any area that is not Indian country,
nor to any act or transaction within any ar&'t of Indian country
provided such act or transaction is in conformity both with the laws
of thr Stnte in which such act or transaction occurs and with an
ordinance duly adopted by the tribe having jurisdiction over sucl1
area of Indian country, certified by the Secretary of the Interior,
and pnbliHhcd in the Frderal Register."
5 Tho ordinance was properly approved by the Secretary of the
Interior and pnhlished in the Feqcrul Register. 37 Fed. Reg. 12531254 (Jan. 27, 1972).

•.
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warnings that they would be subject to criminal charges
if they continued to operate without one. The Tribes
held a public hearing which Martin Mazurie and the Mazuries' lawyer attended. Witnesses protested grant of
the license, complaining of singing and shooting at late
hours, disturbances of elderly residents of a nearby housing development, and the permitting of Indian minors in
the bar. The application was denied.
Thereafter, the Mazuries closed The Blue Bull. Three
weeks later they reopened it. It remained in operation
for approximately a year, until federal officers seized its
alcoholic beverages and this criminal prosecution was
initiated. 6
The case was tried to the District Court without a jury.
Since most of the factual issues were disposed of by stipulations/ the testimony at trial primarily dealt with
whether the bar was within "Indian country." On the
basis of testimony about The Blue Bull's location, and
about the racial composition of residents of the surrounding area, the court concluded that the bar was so located.
Holding that federal authority could reach non-Indians
located on privately held land within a reservation's
boundaries, the Court entered a judgment of conviction.
Each respondent was fined $100.
The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. It
concluded that the prosecution had not carried its burden
u The Blur Bull wa~ rt-opened after the decision of the Court of
Appeals. In April 1974, however, Fremont County refused to renew
it;; lieen~r and it wa:-: again clo~ed. Brief for Petitioner 5, n 4; Brief
for Respondent 20, n. 8.
7 It waH stipulated that Thr Blue Bull wn~ bring operated without
the licem;e required by Ordinance No. 26, that alcoholic beverages
had been sold at The Blue Bull, that The Blue Bull was located
within the Wind River Reservation, but on land which it owned in
fee, and that The Blue Bull had been properly licensed by state-:
,~.uthoritics~.

·.
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of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the bar was
not excluded from Indian country by the § 1154 (c) exception for "fee-patented lands in non-Indian communities." 8 This· conclusion was tied directly to the
more basic holding that:
"[T]he terminology of 'non-Indian community' is not
capable of sufficiently precise definition to serve as
s The Di~trict Court did not make a specific finding of faci thai
The Blue Bull was not located in a non-Indian community. The
court did find that it was in "Indian Country" (Petjtion, at 35),
that it was ~ituated "at a site known us Fort Washakie, Wyoming"
(Petition, at 3-!), that "Fort Washakie is not an incorporated nonIndian community with recognized boundaries" (Petition, at 34) , and
that tht> bar had been opt>rated in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1154
(whirh contains the exclusion from "Indian country" of fee-patented
lnnds in non-Indinn communities). The nmbiguity in the trial court's
findings is readily explained by rt>spondents' failure to focu~ on 1he
issue at trial. The nature of defrnse testimony and cross-rxnmination
is discussed below, pp. 7-8. That respondents failed to contest
the issue is further established by their motion to dismiss at the
close of the Government's eviden~e. ' The basis of the motion was
failure "to prove beyond a doubt that [respondents] are operating
in an Indian community" (emphasis added), App., at 64, which even
if true is plainly irrelevant under the wording of§ 1154 (c). Respondents' counsel then proceeded with an argument based on respondents'
unrestricted fee ownership of the property on which the bar was
located. Ibid. In addition, respondents' counsel did not dispute
(,he court's statement at the close of the trial that, the "sole issue"
was "whether or not the Tribal Council has jurisdiction over
deeded land held by these parties in fee .... " Record, Vol. II, p. 140.
The court went. on to state that,
"it is in Indian Country. 'fhere is not any question. You do not
need to cite a single case that this bar and this ten acres is located
in Indian Country. I am not saying it is Indian land, but it is
fndian Country." Ibid .
Again, respondents' counsel made no objection. He also apparently
did not seek to focus the court's attention on the issue by filing either
a post-trial brief or proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law-while both parties had the opportunity to do so, only the
prosecution's submission appears in tho record on appeal.

I
',

·.
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an element of the crime herein considered . . . . The
statute is thus fatally defective by reason of this
indefinite and vague terminology." 487 F. 2d, at 18.
As a second basis for reversal, the court held that
insofar as 18 U. S. C. § 1161 authorized Indian tribes to
adopt ordinances controlling the introduction by nonIndians of alcoholic beverages onto non-Indian land, it
was an invalid congressional attempt to delegate authority. The Court of Appeals also suggested that Congress
itself could not regulate the sale of alcohol by non-Indians
on fee-patented non-Indian lands within Indian
reservations.
II
It is well established that vagueness challenges to.
statutes which do not involve First Am~ndment freedoms
must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at
hand. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.,
372 U.S. 29 (1963). In determining whether§ 1154 (c)
is unconstitutionally vague as to these defendants, we
must therefore first consider the evidence as to the location of the Blue BulP
The evidence showed that the bar was located on the
outskirts of Fort Washakie, Wyoming, an unincorporated'
village bearing the name of the man who was Chief
of the Shoshones during their early years on the Wind
River Reservations. Shoshone Tribe v. United States,
supra, at 486. H armsbn, supra, at 3-4. Fort Washakie

,,.

9 We assumr, arguendo, as has the GovE'rnment in its arguments
before this court, l hat thr prosecution has the burden of proving
that the§ 1154 (c) statutory exceptions are not applicable. Because
of this assumption, and because we conclude that the Government
in any event did carry this burden, we need not consider whether
the exeeptwn must be pleaded and proved by criminal defendants.
Cf. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U. S. 62, 70 (1971) (dealing with
a crimiru1l statute in whicl1 "an <:>xception is incorporated in the·
<ecnactinq clau.se of a statute.") (Emphasis supplied.)

>•
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is the ·location of the Wind River Agency of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, and of the Tribal Headquarters of the
Wind River Tribes. One witness testified that the village
was an "Indian community." App., at 49. The evidence
also showed that of the 212 families living within a 20square-mile area roughly centered on The Blue Bull, 170
were Indian families, 41 were non-Indians, and one was
mixed. A large-scale United States Geological Survey map
was introduced to show the limits of this housing survey.
It indicates that the survey included all settlements within
the Fort Washakie area, and that the nearest not-included concentrations of housing were at Saint James
Church and Ethete, some four miles beyond the boundaries of the survey and some six miles from Fort Washakie.
The evidence also established that the state school serving·
Fort Washakie, and located about two and one-half miles
from The Blue Bull, had a total enrollment of 243 students, 223 of whom were Indian.
Other evidence bearing on whether The Blue Bull was
located in a non-Indian community was Martin Mazurie's.
testimony that the bar served both Indians and nonIndians, and that, "We are kind of out there by ourselves,
you know." App., at 70. A transcript of the hearing on
the Mazuries' application to the Tribes for a retail liquor
license was also admitted at the trial. That transcript
indicates that The Blue Bull was located near a public
housing development populated largely if not entirely by
Indians. Residents of this development complained that
persons leaving the bar late at night, and for one reason
or another having either no transportation or no destination, would wander into the development.
There was no testimony that The Blue Bull was m a
non-Indian community. The defense did obtain acknowledgements by prosecution witnesses that they could
not precisely state the boundaries of the Fort Washakie
lndia:n community, Otherw.ise,. examination by the de-

.·- ,
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fense was directed at establishing tha,t the term "Indian"
was without precise meaning, and that the State of Wyoning generally had jurisdiction over non-Indians and their
lands within the Reservation.
We think that the foregoing evidence was sufficient to
justify the District Court's implied conclusion that Fort
Washakie and its surrounding settlements did not comprise a non-Indian community. We do not read the
opinion of the Court of Appeals as reaching a conclusion
contrary to that we hav~ just stated. That Court instead
based its decision on the proposition that such proof did
not go far enough, a view generated by its opinion of the
requirements this statute must meet in order to avoid the
vice of vagueness. The Court of Appeals was looking for
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of precisely defined concepts of "Indian" and "community." We gather that it
expected persons treated as "Indians" in the housing and
school surveys to be proven to satisfy a specific statutory
definition. Similarly, it apparently expected that proof
concerning the "community" should have conformed to
some specific statutory definition, presumably one keyed
to a geographical area with precise boundaries.
We believe that the Court of Appeals erred by holding
that the Constitution requires proof of such precisely
defined concepts. The prosecution was required to do no
more than prove that The Blue Bull was not located in
a non-Indian community, where that term has a meaning
sufficiently precise for a man of average intelligence to
"reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is
proscribed." United States v. National Dairy Products
Corp., supra, 372 U. S., at 32--33. Given the nature of
The Blue Bull's location and surrounding population, the
statute was sufficient to advise the Mazuries that their
bar was not excepted from tribal regulation by virtue of
being located in a non-Indian comrnunity. 10
10

We note that the § 1154 (c) excrption i::; availablr for fee-
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III
The Court of Appeals expressed doubt that "the Government has the power to regulate a business on the land
it granted in fee without restrictions." 487 F. 2d, at 18.
Because that Court went on to hold that even if Congress did possess such power, it could not be delegated
to an Indian tribe, that Court did not find it necessary to
resolve the issue of congressional power. We do, however, reach the issue, because we hereinafter conclude that
federal authotity was properly delegated to the Indian
tribes. We conclude that federal authority is adequate,
even though the lands were held in fee by non-Indians,
and even though the persons regulated were non-Indians.
Article I, § 8, of the Constitution gives Congress power
"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." This
Court has repeatedly held that this clause affords Congress the power to prohibit or regulate the sale of alcoholic
beverages to tribal Indians, wherever situated, and to
prohibit or regulate the introduction of alcoholic beverages in to Indian country." United States v. Holliday, 3
patPnted land~:< which are in non-Indian rommunities, rather than for
those which are not in Indian communities. This fact renders irrelevant the inability of prosection witnesse~ to specif:t precise boundarie>< of thP Fort Washakie lndiw, community.
We need not detain ourselve:; with an issue which seemed to cause
the Court of Appeals ~ome difficulties, that of what qualifies a person
ns an "Indian." The record phinly establishes that, in the circumstance,; of this ease, the distmction between Indians and non-Indians
was generally understood. Those who testified about the housmg
aud ~chool survey<> displayed no difficulty in making such classifications. Nor did Mr. Mazuric. He t!'stified that when there was
trouble at h1s bar he would call the county sheriff to deal w1th a
non-Indian, hut would call the Tribal Police to deal with an Indian.
Wh<'n his counsel questioned lum ns to how he determined which
was wh1ch, he simply replird, "Becau~e I knew thrm." App., at 70.
11 lt 1:-; mHli~JHlted that tlw Wind Hivrr Tribr,.; haw not brPn
emanctpate<l from Federal guardianship and control. Ther~ is thu~
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Wall. 407, 417-418 (1865); United States v. Forty-three
Gallons of Whiskey, 3 Otto 188, 194-195 (1876); Ex
pm·te Webb, 225 U. S. 663, 683-684 (1912); Perrin v.
United States, 232 U. S. 478, 482 (1914); Johnson v.
Gearlds, 234 U. S. 422, 438-439 ( 1914); United States v.
Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 597 (1916).
Perrin v. United States, supra, demonstrates the controlling principle. It dealt with the sale of intoxicating
beverages within premises owned by non-Indians, on
privately held land in an organized non-Indian municipality. The land originally had been included in the
Yankton Sioux Indian Reservation, but had been ceded
to the United States. The cession agreement, as ratified
and confirmed by Congress, specified that alcoholic beverages would never be sold on the ceded land. The land
was subsequently opened to private non-Indian settlers.
In upholding Perrin's conviction, this Court stated:
"The power of Congress to prohibit the introduction
of intoxicating liquors into an Indian reservation,
wheresoever situate, and to prohibit traffic in such
liquors with tribal Indians, whether upon or off a
reservation and whether within or without the limits·
of a State, does not admit of any doubt. It arises
in part from the clause in the Constitution investing
Congress with authority 'to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian tribes,' and in part from the recognized relation of tribal Indians to the Federal Government." 232 U. S., at 482.
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S. 351 (1962), is a
more recent indication of congressional authority over
events occurring on non-Indian land within a reservation.
no doubt that this ease is properly analyzed in terms of Congress,.
t:xclw;ive constitutional authority to deal with Indian trib~,

'·
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The case concerned an Indian's challenge to a state
burglary conviction. The Indian contended that because
the offense took place within "Indian country," it was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States by
virtue of 18 U. S. C. § 1153. This Court agreed, despite
the fact that the crime occurred on land patented in fee
to non-Indians. While the opinion did not address the
constitutional issue, it did reject a variety of statutory
arguments for excluding the crime's situs from 18 U.S. C.
§ 1151's definition of "Indian country." Of significance
for our purposes is the fact that Congress' authority to
define "Indian country" so broadly, and to supersede
state jurisdiction within the defined· area, went both
unchallenged by the parties and unquestioned by this
Court.
We hold that neither the Constitution nor our previous cases leaves any room for doubt that Congress
possesses the authority to regulate the distribution of
alcoholic beverages by establishments such as The Blue

.
'

Bull.

.

'

IV
The Court of Appeals said, however, that even if the
Congres possessed authority to regulate The Blue Bull,
it could not delega.te such authority to the Indian tribes.
The court reasoned as follows:
"The tribal members are citizens of the United
States. It is difficult to see how such an association
of citizens could exercise any degree of governmental
authority or sovereignty over other citizens who do
not belong, and who cannot participate in any way
in the tribal organization. The situation is in no
way comparable to a city, county, or special district
under state laws. There cannot be such a seperate
'nation' of United States citizens within the bounda-ries of the United States which has any authority~

li.'.
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other than as landowners, over individuals who are
excluded as members.

,.,

"The purported delegation of authority to the
tribal officials contained in 18 U. S. C. § 1161 is
therefore invalid. Congress cannot delegate its authority to a private, voluntary organization, which
is obviously not a governmental agency, to regulate
a business on privately owned lands, no matter where
located. It is obvious that the authority of Congress
under the Constitution to regulate commerce with
Indian Tribes is broad, but it cannot encompass the
relationships here concerned." 487 F. 2d, at 19.
This Court has recognized limits on the authority of
Congress to delegate its legislative power. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). Those limitations are, however, less stringent in cases where the entity
exercising the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject matter. United
States v. Curtiss· Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319322 (1936). Thus it is an important aspect of this case
that Indjan tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and
their territory, Wore ester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 557
(1832); they are "a separate people" possessing "the
power of regulating their internal and social relations . . . ." United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375,
381--382 (1886); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comrn'n, 411 U. S. 164, 173 (1973).
Cases such as Worcester, supra, and Kagama, supra,
surely establish the proposition that Indian tribes within
"Indian country" are a good deal more than "private,
voluntary organizations," and they thus undermine the
rationale of the Court of Appeals' decision. These same

...
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cases in addition make clear that when Congress delegated its authority to control the introduction of alcoholic beverages into [ndian country, it did so to entities
which possess a certain degree of independent authority
over matters that affect the internal and social relations
of tribal life. Clearly the distribution and use of intoxicants is just such a matter. We need not decide whether
this independent authority is itself sufficient for the
Tribes to impose Ordinance No. 26. It is necessary only
to state that the independent tribal authority is quite
sufficient to protect Congress' decision to vest in tribal
councils this portion of its own authority "to regulate
Commerce ... with the Indian tribes." Cf. United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., supra.
The fact -that the Mazuries could not become members
of the tribe, and therefore could not participate in the
tribal government, does not alter our conclusion. This
claim, that because respondents are non-Indians Congress
could not subject them to the authority of the Tribal
Council with respect to the sale of liquor, is answered by
this Court's opinion in Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217
(1959). In holding that the a.uthority of tribal courts
could extend over non-Indians, insofar as concerned their
transactions on a reservation with Indians, we stated:
"It is immaterial that respondent is not an Indian.
He was on the Reservation and the transaction with
an Indian took place there. [Citations omitted.]
The cases in this Court have consistently guarded
the authority of Indian governments over their reservations. Congress recognized this authority in the
Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so ever
since. If this power is to be taken away from them,
it is for Congress to do it. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,
187 U. S. 553, 564-566." 358 U. S., at 223.

·~.
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For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court
of Appeals must be reversed, and the convictions of
respondents reinstated.
Reversed.
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